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THE BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
OF MOUNT LAUREL II
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. *
There has always been a strong strain in American culture empha-
sizing equal treatment before the law;' it is a recurrent strain, and one
that will not go away. From one viewpoint, American history may be
viewed as one long story of how this concern has eventually van-
quished contrary public policies. Yet the process has often been
agonizingly slow. Take for example the story of equal access to land
and housing: public enforcement of private racial covenants survived
for thirty years after racial zoning was held unconstitutional,2 and for
a similar period restrictions upon land ownership by aliens were con-
stitutional? There has been a similar story as to discrimination along
Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; Professor of Geography, Regional De-
velopment and Law, University of Arizona. Of counsel (amicus curiae) in Mount
Laurel I and Oakwood at Madiron, infra.
1. For present purposes this may be distinguished from pure egalitarianism,
which raises different and more difficult issues.
2. The Supreme Court held unconstitutional zoning ordinances which prevented
non-whites from living in "white areas" in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held that state courts cannot
enforce private agreements to exclude persons from the use or occupancy of real es-
tate on the basis of race.
3. In 1923, the Court decided that a state could deny aliens the right to own land
within its borders. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). Sei Fujii v. California,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), marked the end of this form of discrimination.
Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (a state alien land law could not be used
to deprive a minor American citizen of lands actually purchased by his alien father-
a unanimous decision, but 5-4 on the narrow basis of invalidating a presumption
which was purely racial in its operation).
In the case of both racial zoning laws and alien land laws, the later decisions were
not simply superior exercises in logic; after the Second World War, the use of govern-
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economic lines, that is, against not only the minority poor but the
poor generally. In 1953, the New Jersey Supreme Court announced
the advent of judicial approval of-nay, even enthusiastic endorse-
ment of-precisely such economic discrimination.4 Here again, the
timetable for the reassertion of democratic values has been roughly
similar; Southern Burlington County N.A.A. CP. v. Townshi of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel 1) 1 came in 1975, and has now been strongly
reaffirmed in 1983 (Mount Laurel II).6
I. THE BACKGROUND
In recent decades, planning law in this country has been character-
ized by a series of sharp zigs and zags, which must seem quite baffling
to the uninitiated. Actually, the pattern of decisions has been clear-
cut, although extremely complex. Up until about 1950 the case law
was moving, slowly but definitely, towards increased respect for mu-
nicipal decisions on the use of land. The 1950's and the 1960's saw a
sharp shift, at least in the leading states. By a conscious change of
judicial policy, the courts decided to give the towns relatively free
rein in regulating buildings and activities on land, to pursue whatever
aspects of their own general welfare seemed most appropriate to
them. In this period the "general welfare" was defined quite specifi-
cally as the welfare of each individual town, with the clear implica-
tion that the devil could take the hindmost.
Under the prevailing "fairly debatable" test, any restriction on
land use was upheld, particularly if it concerned a residential area, as
long as there was something which could be said in its favor. In other
words, if a lawyer defending such a restriction was struck dumb as he
mental measures to enforce the particular discriminations involved was no longer
morally tolerable.
4. Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Township, 8 N.J. Super. 468, 73 A.2d 287 (Law Div.
1950), rev'd, 9 NJ. Super. 83, 74 A.2d 609 (App. Div. 1950), on remand, 13 N.J.
Super. 490, 80 A.2d 650 (Law Div. 1951), rev'd, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (minimum building size regulations approved).
Lionshead Lake was discussed, and much of it was rejected, though not officially
overruled, in a later decision. See infra note 42.
5. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808
(1975).
6. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount
Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983), decided along with Urban League of
Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret; Caputo v. Township of Chester; Glenview Dev.
Co. v. Franklin Township; Urban League of Essex County v. Township of Mahwah;
Round Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clinton.
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rose before the court, and could think of nothing to say, the restric-
tion would be in some real trouble-but as long as he could manage
to keep on making a noise like a lawyer, all would be well.7
This era of judicial laissez-faire and judicial respect for "home
rule" led, not surprisingly, to various unhappy consequences; some
municipal control of land use was arbitrary as to developers, and
more was exclusionary as to large groups of the population.' A few
commentators had concentrated on these problems all along,9 but ap-
parently most people did not want to deal with them. By the late
1960's, however, the word was getting around even to the judges.
Around 1970, there was a clear and widespread shift towards a more
skeptical judicial attitude about municipal autonomy regarding land
use. In the 1970's (again in the leading states), a more active judicial
review was thus characterized by a prevalent suspicion as to what the
towns were really up to. This active judicial review has continued
into the 1980's, but if a town has a good reason for its land use re-
strictions-that is, if the goal sought is clearly legitimate, and the
means used are reasonably appropriate-all will be well. Municipal
attorneys are now therefore well advised to pay more attention to
Brandeis briefs, and less to the presumption of validity: municipali-
ties must have good reasons for their actions. The changed attitude
was most obvious in the sudden development, around 1970, of a
wave of anti-exclusionary litigation, but it also underlies the changed
attitude towards the planning basis for zoning, and a more restrictive
attitude towards approving variances.
II. ANTI-EXCLUSIONARY LITIGATION IN NEW JERSEY
In anti-exclusionary litigation principal attention necessarily fo-
7 American planning law consists primarily, but not entirely, of reported zoning
cases, now running at about 600 annually. The description of trends above is neces-
sarily greatly over-simplified. For a fuller description, see N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW ch. 2-7 (1974-75).
8 Among many problems, one was dominant: the overall system, including the
effects of the local real property tax system, was heavily stacked in favor of those land
uses thought to be "good ratables," and against those considered "bad ratables."
9 For early examples, see Williams, Zoning and Planning Notes, THE AMERICAN
CITY, Feb. 1951, at 129, Oct. 1951, at 130-3 1, and Dec. 1952, at 125; Haar, Zoningfor
Minimum Standards.- The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953);
Haar, Wayne Township. Zoningfor ,hom?-In BriefRepl,, 67 HARV. L. REv. 986
(1954); Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
317 (1955).
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cused on New Jersey for a number of reasons. First, the New Jersey
court had long been the leading court in all kinds of zoning matters-
in part because New Jersey is more intensely settled than any other
state, so that more land-use conflicts arise, and in part because of the
competence of the New Jersey Supreme Court, led by four distin-
guished judges--Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Francis, Hall,
and Jacobs. Moreover, it was the New Jersey court which had devel-
oped the pro-exclusionary rationale in the early 1950's;1O therefore,
New Jersey was the place where it had to be destroyed. Finally, the
logical author to lead the great reversal was already on the New
Jersey court; the first sign of a broadside attack upon exclusionary
practices came in the famous 1962 dissenting opinion of Justice Fred-
erick Hall in Vickers v. Gloucester Townshp. I Justice Hall's dissent
has long been recognized as the most distinguished opinion in the
field of planning law.
By the late 1960's, however, the world suddenly began to look
rather different than it had when Justice Hall wrote his Vickers dis-
sent, and other judges began to reexamine their tolerance of exclu-
sionary zoning practices. In an otherwise relatively unimportant
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1970 upheld (against a chal-
lenge by neighbors) a New Jersey "d" variance12 approving a hous-
ing project in Englewood, which was (a) located in a "white area"
and (b) clearly designed at least in part to accommodate blacks from
the Englewood ghetto. 3 In upholding the grant of the variance, the
opinion-by Hall, and now unanimous--commented in dictum that
under those circumstances such a variance could not have been de-
nied. The only logical basis for this comment is that there must be
some affirmative duty to plan on behalf of all sections of the popula-
tion. Once those familiar with this field of law read the Englewood
10. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Township, 8 N.J. Super. 468, 73 A.2d 287
287 (Law Div. 1950), revy' 9 N.J. Super. 83, 74 A.2d 609 (App. Div. 1950), on remand,
13 N.J. Super. 490, 80 A.2d 650 (Law Div. 1951), rev'd, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
11. 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233
(1963). Only Justice Schettino agreed at the time. The majority opinion was over-
ruled by Mount Laurel II.
12. A New Jersey "d" variance is a unique form of special permit (not really a
variance), essentially without standards, which has flourished in New Jersey. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70(d) (West Supp. 1983).
13. DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Hous. Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31
(1970).
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opinion, it was clear that the jig was up; the court seemed to be send-
ing out signals that it was ready for a major reversal on the exclusion-
ary problem. What ensued was a great rush, in New Jersey and other
states, to be the hero who slayed the dragon of exclusionary zoning,
and all sorts of badly-thought-out cases were brought by people nec-
essarily in a hurry.
Mount Laurel became the leading case in an odd way. It was long
thought that the leading case for the great reversal would be one
brought against Madison Township in Middlesex County, usually re-
ferred to as Oakwood at Madison.14 This case was argued first before
the whole New Jersey Supreme Court in March, 1973, along with
another case from South Jersey which had not received much public
attention (Mount Laurel 1). At the end of that term the two cases
were set down for reargument the following year, presumably be-
cause the personnel on the court were changing, and it was deemed
wise to let the new judges decide how they wanted to deal with this
complex problem. At the second oral argument in January, 1974,
however, Oakwood at Madison fell apart in extraordinary fashion.
Suddenly everyone in the courtroom realized that the vehicle for the
great reversal would be the relatively unknown case from South
Jersey.' 5 Mount Laurel I had been brought by lawyers working for
14. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971), and 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Law Div. 1974),
aft'd, 72 NJ. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977) (overruled in part by Mount Laurel II).
Oakwoodat Madison was brought by a well-financed civic organization, organized
for the specific purpose of opening up the suburbs to lower-income housing, which
carried on a brilliant propaganda campaign on the issue. This case was not a happy
choice. Madison Township had been undergoing very rapid growth, so it was at least
a possible candidate for a legitimate slow-down under some sort of growth-manage-
ment scheme, and it was the only township in central New Jersey which had permit-
ted large numbers of multiple dwellings as of right. (In fact, in the years before the
suit was brought, a majority of recent construction was in garden apartments rather
than single-family houses-a unique situation in the area.) Moreover, the plaitiffs
aligned themselves with a developer, presumably to protect themselves against an
argument that they did not have standing to bring the case; that developer's choice of
a site for the proposed rather intensive housing was an ecologically sensitive site,
where both the ground water and the surface rn-off would be used (now or in the
future) for drinking water. When the question of standing to sue came up in the
course of oral argument on Oakwood at Madison and Mount Laurel, Chief Justice
Weintraub dismissed the matter with his usual blunt vigor: "Counsel, don't waste our
time arguing about questions of standing. If there is any such question in this suit, we
herewith grant standing. Proceed."
15. Many of those in the courtroom, including me, did not even know where
Mount Laurel was. There was a certain amount of quiet looking into the atlases.
1984)
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Camden Legal Services, and was directed against a township just en-
tering a period of large-scale development, with some scattered rural
slums remaining from an earlier period, characterized by a lot of mi-
gratory agricultural labor. To these lawyers (led by Karl Bisgaier)
belongs all the credit that the great reversal came at all, or at least
that it came without several years of further delay. The complaint
was phrased largely in terms of racial exclusion; the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided to transmute the case into one involving seg-
regation along economic lines-that is, segregation of the poor gener-
ally, regardless of their race.
Mt. Laurel I, written by Justice Hall as his farewell to the bench,
has been the subject of extensive commentary practically everywhere,
and need not be reviewed in detail here. 6 Clearly the most impor-
tant zoning opinion since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,I7 it
does not have quite the distinction of Hall's dissent in Vickers, pre-
sumably because of the importance of producing a unanimous opin-
ion. The decision nevertheless established, without dissent, three
major points:
1. Zoning restrictions must affirmatively promote the general
welfare, on a regional basis.
2. The need for housing, and particularly for low- and mod-
erate-cost housing, is a major facet of the regional general wel-
fare-and, in effect, a favored use.
3. Each municipality has the responsibility for its "fair
share" of the regional housing need.
The decision was phrased in terms of "developing municipalities,"
because that was the type of municipality then before the court. As
usual in landmark decisions, major questions remained for later reso-
16. E.g., Rose, Oakwood at Madison: A Tactical Retreat to Preserve the Mount
Laurel Principle, 13 URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1977); Williams & Doughty, Studies in Legal
Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (1975);
Note, Exclusionary Zoning: The Viewfrom Mt. Laurel, 40 ALB. L. REv. 646 (1976);
Note, The Inadequacy ofJudicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 760 (1976); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Timed Growth: Resolving the Issue
after Mount Laurel, 30 RuTGERS L. REV. 1237 (1977); Note, Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 182 (1975);
Note, The Mount Laurel Case: A Question of Remedies, 37 U. PiTr. L. REV. 442
(1975); Note, Fical-Based Exclusionary Zoning Ordinance Invalidated as Improper
Exercise of State Police Power, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 341 (1975); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning. The
Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Implications of the Madison Township Case, 8 SETON
HALL L. REV. 460 (1977).
17. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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lution-including how to define a region (or sub-region), how to de-
termine "fair share," and the appropriateness of various remedies.
Il1. ANTI-EXCLUSIONARY LITIGATION IN OTHER STATES
While primary attention necessarily and properly focused on New
Jersey, much was going on in the rest of the country as well. In per-
haps the most important development, the courts of the two largest
states have fairly explicitly adopted the most important part of Mount
Laurel I, the regional general welfare approach. Two important
opinions in the lower federal courts explicitly reasoned along the
same lines."s
The leading cases from the two biggest states originated in connec-
tion with ordinances dealing with "growth management"-that is,
regulating the rate of growth in relation to the availability of public
services. In New York, the first important "growth management"
case in the 1970's upheld a scheme in the town of Ramapo in Rock-
land County, which required residential development to await the
availability of part of the necessary public infrastructure. t9 Judge
Breitel dissented strongly, in an opinion essentially maintaining that
the towns could no longer be trusted with major land use controls.
Clearly in answer to this dissent, the majority, in an otherwise rather
confused opinion, made a strong, but rhetorical, statement against
exclusionary zoning: "What we will not contenance, then, under any
guise is community efforts at immunization or exclusion."20 There is
little definition of "exclusionary" in either the majority or the dissent.
18. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W D.N.Y.). afd. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th
Cir. 1970), on remand, No. 51590 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 1970). The critical paragraph in
Southern Alameda read as follows:
Given the recognized importance of equal opportunities in housing, it may
well be, as a matter of law, that it is the responsibility of a city and its planning
officials to see that the city's plan as initiated or as it develops accommodates the
needs of its low-income families, who usually-if not always-are members of
minority groups.
424 F.2d at 295-96.
19. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). This was not the first case upholding the regulation of the
timing of development in relation to the availability of public services, which
originated a decade earlier in the adjacent town of Clarkstown. See Josephs v. Town
Bd of Town of Clarkstown, 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
20. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152, 285 N.E.2d at 302.
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In a subsequent case2' the court cited this language from Ramapo
and went on to argue that suburban housing needs should be consid-
ered over a substantial area, clearly implying that various housing
types would be needed. In a California case directly involving
growth management,22 a town inland from the East Bay region was
explicitly regulating growth in relation to the availability of school
seats. The prevailing opinion, written by Justice Tobriner, adopted
the Mount Laurel rationale in a significant passage, which may be
cited as the best example of the spreading influence of Mount
Laurel.23
Moreover, there has been some significant movement in other
states. The case against exclusionary zoning in California has been
21. Berenson v. New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236
(1975), and 67 A. D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (2d Dept. 1979)-the latter reversing an
important, but unreported, lower-court opinion, which had mandated "fair share."
For a discussion of the lower-court opinion, see 3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW (1974-75), § 66.19 Supp., at 85.
22. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
23. The court stated:
A number of recent decisions from courts of other states, however, have declined
to accord the traditional deference to legislative judgment in the review of exclu-
sionary ordinances, and ruled that communities lacked authority to adopt such
ordinances. Plaintiff urges that we apply the standards of review employed in
those decisions in passing upon the instant ordinance.
The cases cited by plaintiff, however, cannot serve as a guide to resolution of
the present controversy. Not only do those decisions rest, for the most part, upon
principles of state law inapplicable in California, but, unlike the present case, all
involve ordinances which impede the ability of low or moderate income persons
to immigrate to a community but permit largely unimpeded entry by wealthier
persons. (Footnote omitted.)
We therefore reaffirm the established constitutional principle that a local land
use ordinance falls within the authority of the police power if it is reasonably
related to the public welfare. Most previous decisions applying this test, how-
ever, have involved ordinances without substantial effect beyond the municipal
boundaries. The present ordinance, in contrast, significantly affects the interests
of nonresidents who are not represented in the city legislative body and cannot
vote on a city initiative. We therefore believe it desirable for the guidance of the
trial court to clarify the application of the traditional police power test to an
ordinance which significantly affects nonresidents of the municipality.
When we inquire whether an ordinance reasonably relates to the public wel-
fare, inquiry should begin by asking whose welfare must the ordinance serve. In
past cases, when discussing ordinances without significant effect beyond the mu-
nicipal boundaries, we have been content to assume that the ordinance need only
reasonably relate to the welfare of the enacting municipality and its residents.
But municipalities are not isolated islands remote from the needs and problems
of the area in which they are located; thus an ordinance, superficially reasonable
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/2
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strengthened by an amendment to the state planning enabling act,
from the limited viewpoint of the municipality, may be disclosed as unreasonable
when viewed from a larger perspective.
These considerations impel us to the conclusion that the proper constitutional
test is one which inquires whether the ordinance reasonably relates to the welfare
of those whom it significantly affects. If its impact is limited to the city bounda-
ries, the inquiry may be limited accordingly: if, as alleged here, the ordinance
may strongly influence the supply and distribution of housing for an entire met-
ropolitan region, judicial inquiry must consider the welfare of that region. (Foot-
note omitted.)
As far back as Euclid Y. Ambler Co., courts recognized "the possibility of cases
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the munic-
ipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way." (272 U.S.
365, 390, 47 S. Ct. 114, 119, 71 L. Ed. 303.) More recently, in Scott v. Indian
Wells(1972), 6 Cal.3d 541, 99 Ca. Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137, we stated that "To
hold . . that defendant city may zone the land within its border without any
concern for [nonresidents] would indeed 'make a fetish out of invisible municipal
boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of zoning."' (P. 648, 99 Cal.
Rptr. p. 749, 492 P.2d p. 1141.) The New Jersey Supreme Court summed up the
principle and explained its doctrinal basis: "[I]t is fundamental and not to be
forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of the state and the local au-
thority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in the same
manner as is the state. So, when regulation does have a substantial external im-
pact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the particular mu-
nicipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served." (So.
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, supra, 336 A.2d 713, 720.) (Foot-
note omitted.)
We explain the process by which a trial court may determine whether a chal-
lenged restriction reasonably relates to the regional welfare. The first step in that
analysis is to forecast the probable effect and duration of the restriction. In the
instant case the Livermore ordinance posits a total ban on residential construc-
tion, but one which terminates as soon as public facilities reach specified stan-
dards. Thus to evaluate the impact of the restriction, the court must ascertain the
extent to which public facilities currently fall short of the specified standards,
must inquire whether the city or appropriate regional agencies have undertaken
to construct needed improvements, and must determine when the improvements
are likely to be completed.
The second step is to identify the competing interests affected by the restric-
tion. We touch in this area deep social antagonisms. We allude to the conflict
between the environmental protectionists and the egalitarian humanists; a colli-
sion between the forces that would save the benefits of nature and those that
would preserve the opportunity of people in general to settle. Suburban residents
who seek to overcome problems of inadequate schools and public facilities to
secure "the blessing of quiet seclusion and clear air" and to "make the area a
sanctuary for people" (Village fBelle Terre v. Boraas, supra, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.
Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797) may assert a vital interest in limiting immigra-
tion to their community. Outsiders searching for a place to live in the face of a
growing shortage of adequate housing, and hoping to share in the perceived ben-
efits of suburban life. may present a countervailing interest opposing barriers to
immigration.
Having identified and weighed the competing interests, the final step is to de-
termine whether the ordinance, in light of its probable impact, represents a rea-
1984]
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requiring a "housing element" as part of each town's mandatory
master plan.24 Massachusetts, nearly alone among the states, has
adopted an "anti-snob zoning law," under which a state agency is
authorized to give a comprehensive permit for low-income housing in
any instance where there is a shortage of such housing in a given
town.' In a considerable volume of litigation, the courts have up-
sonable accommodation of the competing interests. (Footnote omitted.) We do
not hold that a court in inquiring whether an ordinance reasonably relates to the
regional welfare, cannot defer to the judgment of the municipality's legislative
body. (Footnote omitted.) But judicial deference is not judicial abdication. The
ordinance must have a real and substantial relation to the public welfare. (Miller
v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. 477, 490, 234 P. 381.) There must be a
reasonable basis in fact, not in fancy, to support the legislative determination.
(ConsolidatedRock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1962) 57 Cal.2d 515, 522,
20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342 (1962). Although in many cases it will be "fairly
debatable" (Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, 272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L.
Ed. 303) that the ordinance reasonably relates to the regional welfare, it cannot
be assumed that a land use ordinance can never be invalidated as an enactment
in excess of the police power.
The burden rests with the party challenging the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance to present the evidence and documentation which the court will require in
undertaking this constitutional analysis.
18 Cal. 3d at 606-09, 557 P.2d at 486-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54-57.
24. The amended act reads as follows:
The general plan shall consist of a statement of development policies and shall
include a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth objectives, principles, stan-
dards, and plan proposals. The plan shall include the following elements:
c) A housing element as provided in Article 10.6 (commencing with Section
65580).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (Deering Supp. 1983).
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 20 (West 1969). "Shortage" is arbitrarily
defined.
In addition, a few other states have made some legislative progress in this area.
Perhaps the most striking example is in Vermont, where a recent amendment to the
State Planning and Development Act provided an administrative remedy for those
unable to afford a lawyer to challenge exclusionary zoning, with a remedy strikingly
like one of those suggested in Mount Laurel II. The amendment provides:
The attorney general or his designee may investigate and may hold a public
hearing when there is a complaint that a bylaw or its manner of administration
violates subdivision 4406(4) or subsection (d) of § 4382 or subsection (b) of
§ 4383 relating to mobile homes, mobile home parks and adequate housing.
Upon determining after hearing that a violation has occurred, the attorney gen-
eral may file an action to challenge the validity of the bylaw or its manner of
administration in the superior court in the county where the municipality lies. In
any such action, the municipality shall have the burden of proof to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged bylaw or its manner of admin-
istration does not violate the above provisions. If the court finds the bylaw or its
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/2
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held this provision against various kinds of attack.26 Similarly, the
Massachusetts court has upheld the right of another Boston suburb to
permit low- and moderate-income housing, while at the same time
excluding any other type of multiple dwelling.27 Some of the smaller
states, particularly in the Northeast Corridor, have been moving in
the same general direction. Even in Connecticut, where large-lot
zoning is a major and much-praised tradition,28 a court has indicated
that the use of zoning to exclude people for ethnic or economic rea-
administration to be in violation, it shall grant the municipality a reasonable
period of time to correct the violation, and may extend that time. If the violation
continues after that time, the court shall order the municipality to grant all re-
quested permits and certificates of occupancy for housing relating to the area of
continuing violation.
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24. § 4445a (Supp. 1983).
The basic provisions referred to read as follows:
§4406:
4) Equal treatment of housing.
A) Except as provided in section 4407(6) of this title, no zoning regulation
shall have the effect of excluding mobile homes, modular housing, or other forms
of prefabricated housing from the municipality, except upon the same terms and
conditions as conventional housing is excluded.
B) No zoning regulation shall have the effect of excluding from the munici-
pality housing to meet the needs of the population as determined in section
4382(c) of this title.
C) No provision of this chapter shall be construed to prevent the establish-
ment of mobile home parks pursuant to chapter 153 of Title 10.
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 4406 (Supp. 1983).
§4382:
d) A municipal plan shall consider the housing needs of the existing and pro-
jected population, and may classify suitable land areas for appropriate housing
to meet the need of the existing and projected population and to further the pur-
poses of section 4302(a) of this title.
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 4382 (Supp. 1983).
§ 4383. The plan for a rural town:
b) A rural plan shall consider the housing needs of the existing and projected
population, and may classify suitable land areas for appropriate housing to meet the
need of the existing and projected population and to further the purposes of section
4302(a) of this title.
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 4383 (Supp. 1983).
26. Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of
Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973).
27. Cameron v. Zoning Agent of Bellingham, 357 Mass. 757, 260 N.E.2d" 143
(1970).
28. Senior v. Zoning Comm'n of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415
(1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960).
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sons "might in fact be constitutionally impermissible."29 A similar
hint was given by the Maine court at about the same time.30
IV. ANTI-EXCLUSIONARY LITIGATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
The role of the United States Supreme Court cannot be ignored, of
course, although the state courts have been trying their best to keep
the Court out of this area. Before the exclusionary issue became a
crisis in New Jersey, the Supreme Court began issuing opinions
which had the clear effect (one can only speculate as to the motive) of
chilling the enthusiasm for anti-exclusionary litigation. The first of
these 31 involved a California provision requiring that any proposed
low-cost housing project-but no other type of housing-had to be
submitted to a local referendum. The Supreme Court upheld this
provision on the ground that a referendum was inherently a demo-
cratic device-a decision clearly traceable to Black's ancient popu-
lism. In the next case32 the Court construed the rules on standing for
federal courts rather narrowly to dismiss a case brought on behalf of
black residents of Rochester against the allegedly exclusionary zon-
ing in a nearby suburb. In a third case, Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,33 the Court rejected an attack on a suburban zoning provi-
sion which limited to two the number of unrelated individuals who
could live in a house in a single-family district, whereas of course a
normal family could be of any size.34 Finally, in Village of Arlington
29. Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Windsor, 306 A.2d 151, 159, 30
Conn. Supp. 157, 171 (1973).
30. Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Yarmouth, 313 A.2d 741 (Me.
1974).
For a number of reasons there is no need to take seriously in this connection the
following rather highly publicized Pennsylvania decisions: National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa.
466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); and Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
These decisions are clearly concerned with a quite different question-essentially that
of "growth management," ite., restrictions on the amount and the rate of growth, with
no trace of special concern for low- and moderate-income housing. This is perfectly
clear in Girsh. Moreover, the leading opinion in perhaps the best-known of these,
Kitmar, is not the opinion of the court, but merely an opinion signed by a minority of
three judges. Finally, the strong language against large-lot zoning in National Land
and Kitmar has, in effect, been overruled by more recent Pennsylvania cases uphold-
ing much larger lot requirements.
31. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
32. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
33. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
34. The case is typical of how badly some of the anti-exclusionary litigation has
[Vol. 26:3
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Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Seventh
Circuit issued a strong opinion condemning suburban exclusionary
zoning, yet this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in an
opinion which simply did not deal with zoning at all-it rested on a
precedent 36 which involved the discriminatory effect of a civil service
exam, which might be thought to raise rather different questions.
Based on this precedent, the Court ruled that proof that certain re-
strictions had the effect of segregation was constitutionally irrelevant,
so long as there was no showing of an intent to segregate. In other
words, as long as segregationists refrained from shouting their mo-
tives from the housetops, they could do anything they wanted with-
out running afoul of the Constitution.
A good deal of recent trouble has resulted from the poor choice of
cases to raise the exclusionary issue before the courts. Thus, it was in
a case actually involving a restriction on a landlord's right to evict3 7
that the Supreme Court concluded that housing was not a "funda-
mental interest" triggering "strict scrutiny" under the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. (Under the alternative "rational re-
lationship" test, almost every state action passes; the choice of test is
where the actual decision is made.) Obviously, a case like this could
give the Court no notion of the full extent of the shut-out, explicitly
decreed by public authority, which was fully documented only in
New Jersey3" but obviously existed elsewhere.
The Supreme Court has now been threatening to upset the whole
been thought through. A major problem here was that the lawyers who brought the
case for the student plaintiffs had run out of student plaintiffs by the time the case got
to the U.S. Supreme Court-all the students originally involved had graduated, and
apparently there were no new students who wished to join the attack. As a result,
Douglas and the Court majority treated the matter simply as a question of the eco-
nomic return to the landlord-from how many students could he get rent?
Moreover, the direct attack on the single-family principle was almost ideally
designed to raise hackles about the defense of low-density areas and "the American
home:" even Mount Laurel!! does not attack that, in principle. Because the plaintiffs
lost, the result was a disaster, but even if they had won, it is unlikely that the resulting
principle would have been broad enough to provide much help in the main anti-
exclusionary campaign on behalf of the lower-income groups.
35. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
36 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
37. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). See also supra notes 13 and 33.
38 Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of Nbrth-
Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971) and 4 LAND USE CONTROLS
QUARTERLY 1 (1970). Somewhat similar documentation, on a lesser scale, is now
necessarily being built up in Oregon under their land use legislation.
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applecart, and in effect create a whole new land use control system,
by foisting upon all the state courts a constitutional requirement that
damages be paid whenever the zoning of a particular tract is found to
be a "taking"."
V. POST-MOUNT LAUREL I ANTI-EXCLUSIONARY LITIGATION IN
NEW JERSEY
Presumably because of extensive changes in the personnel of the
New Jersey Supreme Court-in the last fifteen years there have been
two practically complete turnovers in its personnel, so that in effect
three courts have ruled on these matters-the New Jersey court was
waffling on Mount Laurel issues for a long period in the late 1970's.O
The first step backward came in Oakwood at Madison; that case fi-
nally did reach the court in a state ready for serious decision-and
then did a lot more harm than good. The court used it to step back-
wards in two important ways. First, a serious question was raised
about whether Middlesex County was an appropriate sub-region to
consider for purposes of analyzing housing need; apparently the
available documentation on this point was none too strong. Second,
and much more serious, Judge Furman below had had considerable
difficulty in establishing a precise figure for housing need in Madison
Township, because it is very difficult to establish such a figure for a
single township. (This is one reason that a case brought against a
single township is inherently vulnerable.) On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that, because Furman had had so much trouble
39. Compare Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979), a'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), with San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting). In these two cases, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' zoning of the plaintiffs' property constituted a
"taking" requiring just compensation under the fifth amendment.
40. Of the four giants on the 1960's New Jersey court, two (Hall and Jacobs)
joined in Mount Laurel I and retired soon thereafter. (Chief Justice Weintraub re-
tired between the two oral arguments on Madison and Mount Laurel; Justice Francis,
a bit earlier.) A somewhat different group dominated the opinions in the later 1970's,
holding back from further advances, and backing water a bit. (This group, a bare
majority of the court, included Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain and Clif-
ford, usually joined either by one more regular colleague or by a temporary appointee
from the Appellate Division.) Justice Pashman pressed consistently for a more ac-
tivist course; Justice Schreiber and (occasionally) Justice Sullivan were in between.
The Mount Laurel!! court included only Clifford from the consistent "holding-back-
ers;" Pashman naturally agreed, and Schreiber and Sullivan did also. Chief Justice
Wilentz (author of the opinion) and Justices Handler and Pollack were new to this
controversy.
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in establishing this figure, the court would affirm his decision that he
did not have to set such a figure. Ironically, by that time Judge
Furman had tried a much more broadly-based suit, challenging ex-
clusionary zoning in Middlesex County.4' With the county-wide pic-
ture before him, Furman had been able to establish a figure for
housing need in Madison Township before the New Jersey Supreme
Court had finally passed on the Oakwood at Madison appeal, af-
firming that he could not and need not do so. This created enormous
confusion, as lower courts began to interpret the Oakwood at
Madison decision as saying not only that it was unnecessary to estab-
lish a precise figure, but that it was improper to do so. The basic
notion in Oakwood at Madison, that towns are more likely to comply
with a general instruction to do something, and less likely to comply
if they are told exactly what to do, is one of those things which simply
passes all understanding.
A second major retreat came with respect to fully-developed mu-
nicipalities, of which there are many in New Jersey. In two cases in
1977, a sharply-divided court held that the Mount Laurel rationale,
which in the original opinion was limited to "developing municipali-
ties," did not apply to municipalities which were fully developed.42
As dissenters naturally pointed out, this meant that if a town could
somehow get away with exclusionary zoning until its vacant land was
used up, then it was in free and clear-there was no need to bother
about the poor. As the Court subsequently pointed out in Mount
Laurel II, such municipalities-at least when they were located in
areas with any growth potential-would have a definite but relatively
small need for low- and moderate-income housing, if only to preserve
for people the possibility of staying in a community where they grew
up.
All of this waffling came to a very sharp end with Mount Laurel I.
41. Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359
A.2d 526 (1976), rev'd, 170 N.J. Super. 461, 406 A.2d 1322 (1979) (and again reversed
as one of the cases decided along with Mount Laurel).
42. Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977); Fobe As-
socs. v. Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 6 (1977). The vote was five to two-or,
arguably, four to three. Both were overruled by Mount Laurel I
Another prime example of waffling came in Home Builders' League of S. Jersey,
Inc. v. Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979) (opinion by Schreiber, J.), where the
court rejected all the real substance of LionsheadLake, see supra note 4 and accompa-
nymg text, but did not explicitly overrule it.
On the pattern of voting in this period, see also State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99,405 A.2d
368 (1979) (Hughes, C.J. and Mountain, J. dissenting).
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VI. MOUNT LAUPEL II
The unanimous opinion in Mount Laurel III' is profoundly signifi-
cant in a number of ways. Perhaps its most striking feature, as of this
moment, is that it stands squarely and quite unabashedly in the long
tradition of American liberal humanitarianism. The implications of
this tradition for the Mount Laurel kind of problem are clear enough:
it is the function of judges to vindicate the basic values of our civili-
zation, as it is the function of decent human beings to take a serious
interest in helping those less fortunate." Mount Laurel I states spe-
cifically that the planning and zoning powers must not be used to
favor rich over poor. The description of the prevailing pattern of
ghettoization-by-law rivals that by Justice Hall in the classic Vickers
dissent. The natural consequence of the prevailing attitude in the
opinion is a policy of judicial activism. More frankly than most, the
opinion says almost directly that when a major constitutional right is
involved and the Legislature does not act, the responsibility to act
passes to the judiciary.45
43. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). Twenty-six months elapsed between oral
argument (by some 40 lawyers) and the opinion.
44. This is particularly striking because of the sharp contrast with the dominant
mood in Washington-a mood emphasizing a favoritism to the very rich and to de-
velopers, which has been practically unheard of since before the days of Teddy
Roosevelt.
45. The court stated:
No one has challenged the Mount Laurel doctrine on these appeals. Neverthe-
less, a brief reminder of the judicial role in this sensitive area is appropriate,
since powerful reasons suggest that the matter is better left to the Legislature.
We act first and foremost because the Constitution of our State requires protec-
tion of the interests involved and because the Legislature has not protected them.
We recognize the social and economic controversy (and its political conse-
quences) that has resulted in relatively little legislative action in this field. We
understand the enormous difficulty of achieving a political consensus that might
lead to significant legislation enforcing the constitutional mandate better than we
can, legislation that might completely remove this Court from those controver-
sies. But enforcement of constitutional rights cannot await a supporting political
consensus. So while we have always preferred legislative to judicial action in this
field, we shall continue-until the Legislature acts-to do our best to uphold the
constitutional obligation that underlies the Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our
duty. We may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.
92 N.J. at 212-13, 456 A.2d at 417.
The situation must be remedied. In the absence of executive or legislative ac-
tion to satisfy the constitutional obligation underlying Mount Laurel, the judici-
ary has no choice but to enforce it itself. Enforcement, to be effective, will
require firm judicial management.
92 N.J. at 252, 456 A.2d at 438.
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In the same vein, the opinion is a superb example of "legal real-
ism." The opinion fairly bristles with fine examples of this. Among
the more obvious is the demonstration that it is "nonsense" to call
inclusionary zoning "socio-economic,"" 6 and argue that it is therefore
impermissible, while assuming that other zoning regulations have no
such purpose; a large number of zoning regulations have always had
major social or economic consequences, which are well known to
those who invoke them.47 The only question is whether zoning can be
"socio-economic" in a socially progressive sense, as well as in a re-
gressive sense. Again, there is the demonstration that under present
circumstances reliance on "filtering down" to provide housing for the
poor is absurd. What is happening instead, in a period of heavy in-
flation, is that bad housing is filtering up to higher-income groups.4"
The opinion reflects the time needed for its preparation (more than
two years) by the care with which various possible dodges are fore-
seen and foreclosed. For example, it is noted that local population
forecasts need not be considered conclusive, because these may them-
selves incorporate an assumption of continued exclusionary zoning."9
Moreover, the Court does not hesitate to face some of the most diffi-
cult issues. For example, in reference to keeping lower-income hous-
ing in the lower-income brackets, it is stated specifically the towns
must deal with this problem.5" Finally, the opinion fairly crackles
This case (Mount Laurel) is accompanied by five others, heard together and
decided m this opinion. All involve questions arising from the Mount Laurel
doctrine. They demonstrate the need to put some steel into that doctrine.
92 N.J. at 199-200, 456 A.2d at 410.
This puts more directly than usual the theory obviously underlying activist judicial
remedies m the desegregation and reapportionment cases over the last two decades.
The parallels to the situation in exclusionary zoning are obvious. First, after a new
constitutional right has been declared, its implementation requires extensive revision
of legislative and administrative arrangements. Second, the machinery which needs
to be revised for that purpose remains in the hands of those whose good faith cooper-
ation is open to serious question. (The township of Mount Laurel has certainly been
going out of its way to emphasize this point in these proceedings.) Third, for an effec-
tive remedy, continuing judicial supervision is necessary. See generally Williams,
Doughty, & Potter, The Strategy on Exclusionary Zoning: Towards What Rationale
and What Reined,?, 1972 LAND USE CONTROLS ANNUAL 177 (a memorandum which
became the basis of Urban League of New Brunswick).
46. 92 N.J. at 272-73, 456 A.2d at 449.
47. Id at 273, 456 A.2d at 449.
48. Id. at 278, 456 A.2d at 451-52.
49. Id. at 257-58, 456 A.2d at 441.
50. Id. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447.
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with sharp language.51
The opinion opens up new ground in several ways. In addition to
reaffirming the Mount Laurel I doctrines on "regional general wel-
fare" and "fair share," and the importance of employment in connec-
tion therewith, the opinion goes on at enormous length-it runs over
120 pages in the ATLANTIC REPORTER-to spell out in detail how to
make these doctrines effective. It is clear that the court intends to do
51. The court said:
This is the return, eight years later, of Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975) (Mount Laurel!). We set forth in
that case, for the first time, the doctrine requiring that municipalities' land use
regulations provide a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing.
The doctrine has become famous. The Mount Laurel case itself threatens to be-
come infamous. After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial order
invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a bla-
tantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired
experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determi-
nation to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe that there is
widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of our original
opinion in this case.
To the best of our ability, we shall not allow it to continue. This Court is more
firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel doctrine than ever, and we are
determined, within appropriate judicial bounds, to make it work. The obligation
is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation. We have learned
from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Lau-
rel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.
We intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify it, and make it easier for pub-
lic officials, including judges, to apply it.
Id. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 409-10.
And again, in the warnings against misuse of the doctrine by developers:
Of at least equal importance, the criteria will not necessarily result in the
imposition of the obligation in accordance with sound planning. There may be
areas that fit the "developing" description that should not yield to "inevitable
future residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth." Those areas
may contain prime agricultural land, open spaces and areas of scenic beauty;
apart from these their development might impose unacceptable demands on pub-
lic investment to extend the infrastructure required to support such growth. In-
deed, to some extent the very definition of "developing" suggests results that are
quite the opposite of sound planning, for the whole purpose of planning is to
prevent or deflect what would otherwise be "inevitable."
Id. at 224, 456 A.2d at 425.
Builders may not be able to build just where they want-our parks, farms, and
conservation areas are not a land bank for housing speculators. But if sound
planning of an area allows the rich and middle class to live there, it must also
realistically and practically allow the poor. And if the area will accommodate
factories, it must also find space for workers. The specific location of such hous-
ing will of course continue to depend on sound municipal land use planning.
.[d. at 211, 456 A.2d at 416.
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everything possible to see to it that they will be effective. First, in
place of the distinction between "developing" and "developed" areas,
Mount LaurelH makes the doctrines apply only in "growth areas" as
indicated on an officially adopted State Development Guide Plan.52
The cases exempting any fully-developed municipality are therefore
overruled. (The opinion can be quoted both ways as to whether the
obligation applies also to the indigenous poor, living in substandard
housing in non-growth areas; this is one of the few points where the
opinion is not clear.)53 Second, a wide range of choices is left open to
towns to comply with the Mount Laurel obligation, yet the opinion is
clear and very firm that towns may have to do more than merely
remove obstacles to inexpensive housing. If necessary to get results,
the towns are obligated to take further affirmative steps to encourage
both low- and moderate-income housing. Such actions may include
subsidies-that is, requirements that a stated percentage of a project
must be devoted to low- or moderate-income housing.54 The most
52. NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DIVISION OF STATE AND RE-
GIONAL PLANNING, STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN (1980). The plan was based
on many years of intensive work by a respected planning group, and has been used
for some years in various state-level reviews of development proposals. In the plan
the land in New Jersey has been allocated into the following categories:
Urban Aid Municipalities
Growth Areas
Limited Growth Areas (essentially, a land reserve to accommodate some moder-
ate growth)
Agriculture Areas (with the best soil)
Conservation Areas (to protect natural resources)
Various special areas already under special protection
-the Coastal Zone and the Pinelands
The proposal is that public investment in infrastructure should be concentrated in the
growth areas, and generally kept out of the others. The important point is that in the
Plan these categories have been applied to specific areas of land: there are county
maps showing fairly precise boundaries for the various categories, together with
township boundaries (for purposes of orientation).
Some reservation may be appropriate as to the wisdom of depending so heavily on
the State's Guide Plan. Such administrative measures can easily be gutted if the pres-
sure becomes heavy enough, and the Kean Administration in New Jersey has already
taken a number of steps which appear to gut what is left of a once-impressive state
planning function. The opinion does indicate some concern about this in a footnote,
however, suggesting that the plan will be relied upon so long as, and only so long as,
the court regards it as a sound planning document. (This of course may open up
other problems for the court in the future.)
If the state government chooses not to cooperate, implementation will of course be
much more difficult.
53. 92 N.J. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
54. Id. at 265-69, 456 A,2d at 445-47.
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realistic remedy of all is explicitly stated: towns have an obligation to
zone substantial land to accommodate mobile homes. This is an easy
remedy which is obviously well within the judicial competence.55
(Vickers is therefore overruled.) Third, the size of the fair-share obli-
gation must be quantified precisely-- 56 thus overruling the disastrous
opinion in Oakwood at Madison. Fourth, it is recognized that a cal-
culation of "fair share" may result in different allocations to different
kinds of towns, and the opinion emphasizes strongly that the Mount
Laurel obligation need not preclude diversity of development in vari-
ous parts of New Jersey.57 In this context considerable emphasis is
given to several major themes: the importance of environmental con-
siderations, the appropriateness in certain areas of large-lot zoning,
and even the desirability of no-growth areas, as visualized in the
adopted plan.58 Finally, it is stated explicitly that the anticipated
financial disadvantages resulting from compliance provide no excuse
for non-compliance.59 The Mount Laurel doctrine explicitly applies
only to low- and moderate-income housing, however, and not to any
form of more expensive housing.
A long section on specific remedies is equally impressive, and
equally determined. In brief summary, all Mount Laurel litigation
from now on will be handled by three judges specially assigned to
handle such cases; in all instances such litigation must be settled in a
single trial, with no right of appeal until after a remedy has been
either agreed upon or assigned. (The assignment of three judges
should in time help to clear up the problems resulting from a possible
initial lack of consistency of decisions about regions and fair-share
allocations.) Moreover, judges are encouraged to appoint special
masters to help towns make the necessary zoning changes; specific
instructions are set forth as to when a builder's remedy is indicated.60
Major constitutional litigation may serve to trigger major political
and even social readjustments, and has repeatedly done so-but only
when public opinion is reasonably sympathetic, and when there are
some who are willing to take the initiative to conform. On the sur-
face the 1980's do not look like a propitious time to implement Mount
55. Id. at 274-75, 456 A.2d at 450.
56. Id. at 256-57, 456 A.2d at 440.
57. Id. at 219-20, 456 A.2d at 421.
58. Id. at 230, 456 A.2d at 426.
59. Id. at 285, 456 A.2d at 455.
60. Id. at 314-15, 456 A.2d at 470-71.
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Laurel. The New Jersey Supreme Court has dared to assume that
basic democratic values can be vindicated now, over powerful polit-
ical and institutional opposition. The next few years will show us
whether it is right.
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